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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS-LEYVA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900418-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant's Statements of Jurisdiction, Issues and 
Standards of Review, the Case, and the Facts are contained in 
Appellant's opening brief at 1-9. Appellant relies on those 
statements and the arguments set forth in his opening brief and 
makes the following replies. Issues not addressed in this reply 
brief are adequately addressed in Appellant's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because Appellant was legally licensed to drive in Utah, 
the stop of his vehicle violated the fourth amendment. Nor did the 
officer have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on the 
informant's tip. The State makes this alternative argument for the 
first time on appeal. It objected to developing the facts 
surrounding such argument in the trial court, and the facts which 
were developed do not amount to an objectively reasonable suspicion. 
The pretext doctrine is well established and based on 
important policy considerations. The State has not offered a 
convincing reason for this Court to overrule its own recent 
precedent. The detention in this case was an invalid pretext stop. 
The scope of any detention is a necessary part of any 
analysis as to the reasonableness of the detention. Terry and its 
progeny carved a limited exception to the warrant requirement where 
the detention is based on reasonable articulable suspicion and the 
intrusion is strictly limited to the purpose of the stop. Appellant 
preserved this issue for appeal. 
Appellant did not voluntarily consent to the search of his 
vehicle. 
The State did not establish that officers did not exploit 
the primary illegality. 
Appellant properly marshalled and analyzed the evidence. 
The evidence failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the 
controlled substance and Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE INITIAL DETENTION VIOLATED THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
A. THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A VALID BASIS FOR THE 
STOP. 
(Reply to Point I.A of State's Brief) 
Appellant's argument in Point I.A of his opening brief, 
pages 11-16, is that because he was legally licensed to operate a 
motor vehicle in Utah, the stop of his vehicle was not objectively 
reasonable. 
- 2 -
The first aspect of this argument is that since individuals 
can be licensed in other states and countries, the failure to locate 
a Utah license for the driver does not create a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver has committed a traffic 
violation.1 
Appellant also argues that because he was, in fact, legally 
licensed in Utah, the officer's erroneous belief that Appellant had 
committed a traffic violation was not objectively reasonable. The 
cases cited by Appellant on page 15 of his brief, although not 
directly on point, discuss situations where the information relied 
upon by police officers was incorrect. Appellant cited those cases 
for the proposition that a detention violates the fourth amendment 
where the officers rely on incorrect information in making the stop. 
In the present case, the officer relied on information from 
other police or state agencies in reaching his conclusion that 
Appellant was not legally licensed to drive in Utah. Detective 
McCarthy claimed that he checked several possible names, including 
the name under which Appellant was licensed. Either Detective 
McCarthy or the agencies made an error since Appellant was legally 
licensed to drive. Hence, the seizure was not objectively 
reasonable. See generally United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 
1. Appellant's reliance on State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 
1987), in his opening brief at 13-14 is meant to point out the 
factual distinction between confirming that a Utah license has been 
revoked and simply being unable to find a Utah license. It is not 
meant to suggest a new standard for this Court. See State's brief 
at 9. 
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(1985).2 
The State argues for the first time on appeal that the 
officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on the 
informants tip. State's brief at 11-13. The argument was not 
raised below, nor was it factually developed in the trial court. 
The prosecutor objected in the trial court when defense counsel 
attempted to explore the information given by the informant to the 
officers, and the officers claimed that they stopped the vehicle 
because of a traffic violation and not based on the informant's 
tip. T. 1:11. In addition, the facts in this case did not 
establish a reasonable articulable suspicion. See footnote 3 in 
Appellant's opening brief at 12. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 
301 (1990), is distinguishable from the present case since the tip 
in White contained greater detail and the actions of the defendant 
corroborated more aspects of the tip than in the present case. In 
White, officers received an anonymous phone call, informing them 
that (1) Vanessa White would be leaving a specific address at a 
specific time in a particular car, (2) she would be going to Dobey's 
2. In United States v. DeLeon-Reyna. F.2d (5th Cir. 
April 17, 1991), 1991 WL 55881, cited by the State in a letter of 
supplemental authority dated May 14, 1991, the Court did "not 
question the good faith of the officers who made [the] stop," and 
applied a good faith exception to a warrantless stop. In the 
present case, the officer who made the stop was not acting in good 
faith. Furthermore, although the fifth circuit applies a good faith 
exception to warrantless arrests, such an application is not 
accepted in other jurisdictions, including Utah. In State v. 
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987), the supreme court recognized 
that the good faith or "Leon exception, by its own terms, could 
never apply to an investigatory stop and search." 
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Motel, and (3) she would be in possession of a brown attache case 
which contained cocaine. 110 L.Ed.2d at 306-7. 
A short time later, officers watched a woman leave the 
designated apartment, enter the designated vehicle, and drive in the 
most direct route to the motel. Officers stopped the vehicle "just 
short" of the motel. Id. 
Information that a woman would be leaving a specific 
apartment at around 4:00 p.m. would be more difficult to obtain and 
carry more weight when the activity actually occurred than 
information that an individual would be leaving his place of work 
during the lunch hour. An individual would merely need to know 
where Appellant worked in order to obtain that information in the 
present case. In addition, the tip did not provide officers with 
information as to where Appellant was going. Unlike the situation 
in White, the route traveled by Appellant did not corroborate 
information given in the tip. 
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), also cited 
by the State on page 12 of its brief in support of its argument that 
the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify 
stopping Appellant, involved a citizen informant. In reaching its 
decision, this Court recognized that "[C]ourts view the testimony of 
citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of 
police informers. [citation omitted]." Id. at 284. Hence, Brown 
is distinguishable from the present case. 
Neither the informant's tip nor the officer's inability to 
find a Utah driver's license, despite the fact that Appellant was 
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legally licensed to drive in this state, created a reasonable 
articulable suspicion which would justify the initial detention. 
B. THE STOP OF THE VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION WAS A PRETEXT TO SEARCH FOR DRUGS. 
(Reply to Point I.B of State's Brief) 
But for the officer's desire to search Appellant's vehicle, 
they would not have run a check to determine whether Appellant was 
legally licensed or have stopped Appellant's vehicle. The initial 
detention was therefore not objectively reasonable. 
Although the State requests that this Court reject its 
previously outlined pretext doctrine, it has not offered a 
convincing reason for negating recent precedent. As this Court 
recognized in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-9 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), overruled on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990), the pretext doctrine reflects the responsibility of the 
courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This Court stated: 
[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement 
officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext 
to search for evidence of a more serious crime. 
The violation of a constitutional right by 
subterfuge cannot be justified . . . were the use 
of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for 
searching people suspected of felonies to be 
permitted, a mockery could be made of the Fourth 
Amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be 
vigilant to detect and prevent such a misuse of 
legal processes. 
754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Taglavore v. United 
States, 291 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961). 
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In Sierra, this Court also recognized the importance of the 
pretext doctrine in light of the discretion generally afforded 
police officers: 
M,[I]n most jurisdictions and for most traffic 
offenses the determination of whether to issue a 
citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary 
with the officer,' and . . . 'very few drivers 
can traverse any appreciable distance without 
violating some traffic regulation,' this 
[pretextual traffic stop] is indeed a frightening 
possibility. It is apparent that virtually 
everyone who ventures out onto the public streets 
and highways may then, with little effort by the 
police, be placed in a position where he is 
subject to a full search. Nor is one put at ease 
by what evidence exists as to police practices in 
this regard; it is clear that this subterfuge is 
employed as a means for searching for evidence on 
the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully 
arrested for the crimes of which they are 
suspected." 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978-979, quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 5.2(e) (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted). 
In State v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1972), the court 
explained that the pretext doctrine is also meant to protect equal 
protection principles in law enforcement: 
We conclude that at the bottom of the 
pretextual arrest doctrine is an unarticulated 
application of Yick Wo v. Hopkins [118 U.S. 356 
(1886)]: "Though the law itself be fair on its 
face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is 
applied and administered by public authority with 
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as 
practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the constitution." This 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
suggests that the real evil of searches and 
seizures incident to a traffic arrest is not that 
the arrest is a pretext for the search, but that 
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the arrest is one which would not have been made 
but for the motive of the arresting officer. 
Holmes, 256 So.2d at 34, quoting Yick Wo at 373-374. See also 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) (M[I]n 
the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion, 
whether we are simply allowed to continue on our way with a stern 
look, or instead are stopped and subjected to lengthy and intrusive 
interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no 
more than 'the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us 
or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our 
automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair 
or the color of our skin.7 [Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 416 (1974).]"). 
The term "pretext" is defined by the court in State v. 
Holmes, 256 So.2d 32 (Fla. App. Dist. 2 1972), as 
"A purpose or motive alleged, or an appearance 
assumed, in order to cloak the real intention or 
state of affairs; excuse; pretense; cover; 
semblance." 
Id. at 34 n.8, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of the 
English Language, 2d ed. 1957. 
Numerous courts have defined the pretext doctrine in search 
and seizure cases. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 
1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) ("a pretextual stop occurs when the 
police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search 
a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated 
serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to support a stop."); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 
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1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) ("By definition, a pretextual arrest 
occurs when the police employ an arrest based on probable cause as a 
devise to investigate or search for evidence of an unrelated offense 
for which probable cause is lacking."); People v. Hollowav, 330 
N.W.2d 405, 412 (Mich. 1982) ("'Pretext arrests' are arrests in 
which the officer, although making an apparently lawful arrest, is 
making the arrest to conduct a search for which there is no 
independent probable cause. The basic principle is simply that 
'[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence,7 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 
L.Ed.2d 877 (1932)."); United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 710 
(11th Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile Trooper Vogel's courtroom declaration of 
motive is intriguing, what turns this case is the overwhelming 
objective evidence that Vogel had no interest in investigating 
possible drunk driving charges."). 
In the present case, where the officer made a traffic stop 
based on his desire to search for drugs, the stop and ultimate 
search violated the fourth amendment. 
C. THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION EXCEEDED THE 
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
(Reply to Point I.C of State's Brief) 
Without addressing the merits of Appellant's argument that 
officers exceeded the scope of a traffic stop, the State argues only 
that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. 
Appellant has consistently argued that the detention and 
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subsequent search violated the fourth amendment. T. May 23, 1990: 
2, 5. Analysis of any "level two"3 detention by officers 
necessarily requires an analysis of the reasonableness of the 
initial stop along with an analysis of whether the scope was 
reasonably limited to the purpose of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 153 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 9-10 (Utah 1991). In other words, the scope of any 
permissible Terry stop is strictly limited by the purpose for the 
stop and inextricably linked thereto. Hence, a claim that a 
particular detention violates the fourth amendment raises the issue 
of whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion along 
with the issue of whether the officer's actions were strictly tied 
to the purpose of the stop. Id. 
In Terry, the Court stated: 
This court has held in the past that a search 
which is reasonable at its inception may violate 
the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable 
intensity and scope. [citations omitted]. The 
scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and 
justified by" the circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible. [citations omitted]. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-19. The Terry court carved a limited 
exception which necessarily limited the scope of any intrusions. 
Id. at 30-1. 
3. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987), this Court 
outlined three levels of encounters between police and citizens. 
This case involves a level two encounter, which requires a 
reasonable articulable suspicion in order to be valid under the 
fourth amendment. 
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In State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 13 (Utah 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that: 
The analysis that emerges from Terry and its 
progeny revolves around two closely interrelated 
analytical components: first, the specific and 
articulable facts that justified the action, and 
second, the scope of the interference. [citation 
omitted]. 
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court blurred the two 
components in holding that the detention of a passenger in a vehicle 
for a warrants check violated the Fourth Amendment. 
With the paucity of facts available to him, the 
officer's detention of the passenger beyond what 
was reasonably related in scope to the traffic 
stop was not justified by a articulable suspicion 
that defendant had committed a crime. 
Johnson. 153 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
In Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135, the Utah Supreme Court 
reemphasized the limited scope of a traffic stop. The Court stated: 
In Arizona v. Hicks. 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the Supreme Court 
held that even a small intrusion beyond the 
legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is 
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. 
774 P.2d at 1135. 
Hence, the scope of the intrusion is necessarily linked to 
the purpose of the detention; raising a claim that the detention 
violated the fourth amendment raises a claim that the permissible 
scope was exceeded. 
Furthermore, Appellant discussed the scope of the 
intrusion, albeit briefly, during argument. In opening, counsel for 
Appellant stated: 
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However, we have raised the issues of the 
reasonableness of the stop herein, whether or not 
there was a pretense search; and given that 
status, I believe it is the State's burden to 
establish that reasonableness . . . . 
T. 2. In argument, counsel for Appellant stated: 
The issue is not whether Officer McCarthy could 
stop the vehicle. The issue is really would he 
have made the seizure of Mr. Leyva, absent any 
other kind of illegitimate [motivations]. And 
the issue here is that he was looking for a 
specific violation, but he could stop that car 
and he could effectuate some kind of an arrest, 
some kind of a citation [or] grievance to get 
that car, and he has been quite clear about that 
and I think quite honest. He suspected 
narcotics. He wanted to search that car and he 
was going to search that car. 
T. 51. 
Finally, the cases cited by the State at pages 18-9 do not 
address the issue of whether an argument regarding the scope of an 
intrusion is necessarily raised when the reasonableness of an 
investigatory stop is attacked. 
In all of the cases cited by the State, the appellant 
raised a distinct legal argument which had not been raised below.4 
4. In State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-8 (Utah Ct. App.), rev'd 
on other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. 8 (Utah 1991), the issue was whether 
the appellant could raise a distinct state constitutional argument 
for the first time on appeal. In State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 
254 (Utah 1983), the appellant failed to object in the trial court 
to some comments made by the court which the appellant then attacked 
for the first time on appeal. In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985), the appellant attacked the search of his backpack for 
the first time on appeal; in the trial court, he had attacked only 
the frisk of his person. In State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981), the appellant did not argue in the 
trial court that the seizure was illegal because the officer failed 
to obtain a warrant. In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 
1990), the appellant raised for the first time on appeal an 
(footnote continued) 
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By contrast, in the present case, the reasonableness of the 
detention, which necessarily includes the issue of whehter the scope 
of the detention was proper, was necessarily raised in the trial 
court. 
POINT II. APPELLANT DID NOT GIVE A VALID CONSENT 
TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE. 
(Reply to Point I.D of State's Brief) 
A. APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE 
SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE. 
In State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
We further note that in considering the 
lawfulness of the stop and the seizure and 
search, the trial court should regard with 
caution any claim that the suspect "consented." 
The realities of interactions between private 
citizens and the police are such that "consent" 
is often merely a fiction, particularly when it 
results from illegal police conduct. [citations 
omitted]. 
In this case, the totality of the circumstances establish 
that consent was not voluntarily given. 
B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE OFFICERS 
DID NOT EXPLOIT THE PRIMARY ILLEGALITY. 
Without addressing the merits of Appellants argument in 
this subsection, the State claims simply that the initial detention 
(footnote 4 continued) 
argument that the officers failed to comply with statutory 
requirements in executing a search warrant. 
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was permissible, and that therefore this issue need not be addressed. 
Two cases decided by this Court after Appellant filed his 
opening brief, State v. Carter, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 (Utah App. 
1991), and State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1991), 
offer further guidance in analyzing whether the taint of the primary 
illegality has been attenuated. Both Sims and Carter support 
Appellant's argument that the taint was not attenuated in this case. 
POINT III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT APPELLANT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
(Reply to Point II of State's Brief) 
Contrary to the assertion of the State that Appellant has 
failed to adequately marshal and analyze the evidence (State's Brief 
at 22-3), Appellant has cited the testimonies of Officer McCarthy 
and Agent Englin and has viewed the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict.5 Appellant's position is that, where a 
small amount of cocaine was found under the back seat of an 
automobile where such back seat was occupied by an individual, there 
was insufficient evidence to establish possession by Appellant 
despite the fact that he owned the vehicle. 
Pursuant to State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 318-9 (Utah 1985), 
and State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986), the evidence 
5. In his opening brief at 31-4, Appellant cited the same evidence 
cited by the State at pages 23-4 of its brief as well as the 
evidence argued by the State in closing. T. 2:82. 
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in this case failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the 
controlled substance and Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Salas-Leyva respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this / 7 day of June, 1991. 
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